Portland State University

PDXScholar
Philosophy Faculty Publications and
Presentations

Philosophy

9-1-2022

Book Review of: The Concealed Influence of
Custom: Hume's Treatise from the Inside out
Angela M. Coventry
Portland State University, coventry@pdx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/phl_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Coventry, Angela M., "Book Review of: The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume's Treatise from the
Inside out" (2022). Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations. 80.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/phl_fac/80

This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make
this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

JAY L. GARFIELD. The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume's Treatise from the Inside Out.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 302. ISBN 9780190933401. Cloth $78.
According to Jay L. Garfield in The Concealed Influence of Custom, the aim of David Hume’s
first book A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is to reveal custom’s hidden influence on
human thought and behavior. To make the case, Garfield takes an unorthodox approach to the
three books of the Treatise. Garfield thinks that the second book of Hume’s Treatise on the
social psychology of the passions is the ‘real foundation’ for the epistemology in first book and
the morals in the third book (x). As such Garfield’s interpretative strategy begins with custom in
the context of the passions in Book II and then applies this framework to Books I and III.
Garfield thinks to start with the passions in Book II of the Treatise integrates the ‘mutually
supportive’ strands of skepticism, naturalism and communitarianism present in Hume’s
philosophy (xi). Garfield’s book is an important addition to the secondary literature as the
reading of custom contributes significantly to our understanding of a fundamental aspect of
Hume’s philosophy.
Garfield’s book divides into four parts. The first part has two chapters. Chapter One
outlines the five (defeasible) principles of interpretation that guide his reading of the Treatise.
The first ‘Cover Principle’ recommends that whenever you are ‘unsure about what Hume is
doing, close the book and read the cover’ (4). This reminds us of the subtitle: ‘to introduce the
experimental

Method

of Reasoning into

MORAL SUBJECTS.’

The Treatise says Garfield is about

the psychology of human nature and is an ‘early text in cognitive psychology’ (6). The second
‘Skeptical Inversion Principle’ aligns the skeptical parts of Hume’s text with the Pyrrhonian
tradition. Like the Pyrrhonian sceptics, Hume settles ‘skeptical dilemmas about the justification
of convention by arguing that convention is foundational to ontology’ (9). The third ‘Centrality
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of Custom Principle’ holds that Hume thinks of custom ‘not as something to explain, but rather
as that which explains’ (17). Garfield distinguishes two senses of Hume on custom, ‘custom as
convention and custom as habit’ (17). The first sense of custom is about social regularities,
‘including conventions regarding language, individuation, explanation, praise and blame,’ and
custom as habit concerns ‘individual psychological regularities, or our customary way of
behaving’ that includes habits that reinforce conventions (17). The fourth is the ‘Nominalist
Analysis of Pseudo-Ideas Principle,’ which holds that Hume will often show via the copy
principle that there is no genuine idea attached to many philosophical terms, although he ‘often
argues that it does not follow that the term itself cannot be used meaningfully’ (22). The fifth
‘Principle of the Uniformity of Method’ assumes Hume consistently employs the same
argumentative strategy and analyses across topics.
In the second chapter of Part 1, Garfield answers three questions: ‘Why the Treatise?
Why Book II? Why Custom?’ (28). To the first, Garfield regards the Treatise as a masterpiece
that comprises ‘all of the elements of Hume’s philosophical vision in an organic unity’ (30).
When it comes to the latter two questions, Garfield sees Book II on the passions as the
‘conceptual foundation’ of the Treatise and custom as the foundation of the passions in Book II
(30, 33). For context Garfield situates Hume on custom in the history of British legal theory and
maintains Hume assumes this legal understanding of custom in the Treatise. Garfield finds that
Hume ‘understood customary law—the law that emerged from local patterns of behavior and
traditions—as constituting the foundation of the legitimation of positive law’ (37). The source of
normativity in customary law, ‘is the legitimate expectation of the continuation of traditional
forms of conduct as well as traditional rights and obligations,’ allowing that certain practices are
‘binding’ and justified precisely because they are customary (38). Garfield also emphasizes that
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customs may evolve and change over time and this allows for ‘a kind of progressiveness as law
and morality develop in society’ (44). This sense of custom provides the normativity for Hume’s
epistemology, ethics and politics. Custom permits Hume, Garfield says, to move from the
experimental descriptions of ‘behavior and social regularities’ to ‘the characterization of moral
and epistemic practices with genuine normative content’ (45).
The second part of the book consists of three chapters that cover the basics of the
passions in Book II of the Treatise. Chapter Three covers the structure of the passions in Hume’s
system. Garfield emphasizes that certain passions such as pride and humility have a social
context and this allows a ‘robust social persona’ to emerge (70). The fourth chapter concerns the
causes of passions, the relation of reason and passion, and the freedom of the will. Garfield
shows that both sorts of custom, individual and social, are the ‘fundamental operating principle
of cognition and motivation,’ that shapes not only ‘our actions and personality, but also our
cognitive lives’ (82). Chapter Five takes up Humean moral psychology, which is, on Garfield’s
reading, the ‘interplay between original or innate cognitive predispositions and those that emerge
through natural human intercourse’ (90). Hume’s view on the moral sentiments starts with ‘the
individual psychology of the moral sentiments’ (93). When we consider our own selves, we take
into consideration how others view us, and so for Hume the self is ‘essentially social’ (94). Our
responsiveness to others happens via sympathy and so sympathy ‘forms the foundation of social
life and hence of morality’ (95).
In Part III of the book, Garfield turns to Hume on knowledge and morality in Treatise
Books I and III. This is the longest part and has five chapters in which the five interpretive
principles drive analyses of causality, reason, the external world, the self and morality. Chapter
Seven uses the ‘Cover Principle’ to treat causality as being about human nature (150). Adding in
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the second principle, Garfield thinks Hume is a skeptic about causality in that he denies there is a
‘real causal relation’ or ‘some special necessary connection,’ and that Hume shows we ‘could
not even know what such a thing is’ (128). In line with the third principle, Garfield claims that
Hume on causality depends on the two senses of custom (129). First, ‘the customary habit of
mind that grounds our causal discourse,’ and second, ‘the customs that govern that discourse’
(150). The fourth principle then applies. The discussion of causality is ‘an instance of Hume’s
general strategy of showing that we often believe that we have ideas that we do not’ and then to
show ‘the idea that we do have that guides our causal reasoning in the absence of any proper idea
of causation itself’ (129, 133). The application of each principle taken together illustrates the
fifth principle of interpretation (129). Garfield goes on to apply the same interpretive approach to
the topics of skepticism about reason (Chapter Eight), the external world (Chapter Nine),
personal identity as well as Hume’s skeptical reflections about his own philosophy in the
conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise (Chapter Ten), and ethics (Chapter Eleven).

The final part of the book has two chapters. Chapter Twelve is about Hume’s famous
doubts on personal identity in the Appendix to the Treatise. Garfield canvasses some of the main
strategies employed by scholars to diagnose and resolve the problem before offering his own
diagnosis and solution. The problem that Hume sees in the Appendix, according to Garfield, is
the ‘impossibility of representing one’s own mind,’ and the solution is Hume’s commitment ‘to a
socially embedded account of human nature’ (265, 272). In the last chapter, Garfield reflects on
the Humean vision of the life of humanity. Human beings are ‘natural objects’ that live in a
natural world with thought and behavior patterns determined by natural laws (273). Moreover,
humans are ‘natural artificers’ that invent ‘currencies, communities, courts, and customs’ as well
as a self and external reality (276-7). Garfield contends these fictions for Hume are ‘not opposed
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to truth’ but rather ‘the fictions we create constitute truths’ (277). On Garfield’s Humean picture,
humans are born into and ‘unfold in the context of a collectively constructed social matrix’
(279). Garfield describes that social matrix as ‘a web of practices in which we are raised’ that are
local, contingent, adaptive and capable of normativity (279). Directed by custom, humans are
bound up with, and ‘ineliminably constituted by their social, as well as their biological, histories
and contexts’ (280).
Garfield’s Concealed Influence of Custom is a rich and fascinating exploration of Hume’s
Treatise. Garfield does not claim that his interpretation of Hume’s text is ‘entirely original’ (3),
and admits that for the most part he is following in the tradition of the work of Annette Baier, his
teacher and the legendary Hume scholar to whom the book is dedicated (ix). Yet what makes this
book on Hume novel is the comprehensive range of sources drawn on in the book. There are
connections to the many thinkers who influenced Hume’s thought, the range of subsequent
thinkers influenced by Hume, and the many ways his contributions intersect with current debates
in topics across disciplines. Garfield covers Hume’s philosophical predecessors and
contemporaries such as Sextus Empiricus, Bayle, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Hutcheson,
Shaftesbury, and Mandeville. He also makes connections to philosophers after Hume such as
Schopenhauer, Kant, Wittgenstein, Quine and Sellars as well as more current debates from
behaviorism to connectionism, psychology and the social cognitive sciences. In addition,
Garfield compares Hume’s philosophy to Buddhist views on topics like causality, personal
identity, psychology and custom. In sum, Garfield navigates the Treatise with attention to
diverse historical and contemporary concerns on an array of topics.
Another distinctive feature of Garfield’s work is the legal background of Hume on
custom and its relevance to the Treatise. This is much appreciated for despite the integral role of
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custom and its effects in Hume’s philosophy, he does not conduct an inquiry into the foundation
of custom. Hume emphasizes in the later work, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, that
custom is a ‘universally acknowledged’ principle of human nature and that ‘we can push our
enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as
the ultimate principle’ (EHU 5.5). Garfield’s interpretation of Hume on custom makes sense of
this. On Garfield’s reading, in Hume’s science of the mind, ‘the central explanans is custom’
(17). The fundamental principle of custom is assumed to carry its own justification and is utilized
by Hume as a tool for explanation. This approach to custom contrasts with principles that require
an explanation, like the causal maxim, ‘whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of
existence,’ where Hume must examine in detail ’how experience gives rise to such a principle’
(T 1.3.3.9).
Still, one might question Garfield’s interpretive approach that places the middle book of
the Treatise as the first foundation of the system. Garfield thinks Book I is grounded in Book II,
and that without the customary individual and social psychology of human nature in Book II,
‘the constructive skepticism developed in Book I would be impossible’ (224). Further, Book III,
like Book I, assumes the results of the theory of passions in Book II (228). However, there are
some limits to the approach of beginning with Book II of the Treatise on at least three counts.
First, the approach to start with Book II of the Treatise seems somewhat forced. This is because
it requires we go against the order in which Hume himself deliberately presented the text to the
audience in publication: we must ignore the first book and skip to the second. Second in the
Advertisement to Book III of the Treatise on morals, Hume explicitly states that apart from the
distinction between impressions and ideas, Book III can be read independently of Books I and II.
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This indicates that Hume thought that Book II was not necessary reading for the comprehension
of Book III.
Third, on Garfield’s approach, the crucial role of custom in Book I is diminished.
According to Garfield, ‘while Book I precedes Book II in publication, it rests upon Book II
conceptually’ (224). But a natural and straightforward reading is that Book I comes before Book
II because Book II is based in Book I. After all, the first instance of custom in the Treatise occurs
right at the beginning of Book I to explain abstract ideas (T 1.1.7.7). Further, causal reasoning (T
1.3.8.12), belief (T 1.3.8.10), and necessary connection (T 1.3.14.1) all depend on custom. One
might think the framework of custom set down in Book I is presupposed and elaborated in Book
II, meaning Book II depends on the foundation of Book I. And indeed, Book II on the passions
depends crucially on at least two key topics of Book I: space and time, and reasoning, both
demonstrative and probable.
Hume devotes two sections to the influence of space and time on the passions in Book II
(T 2.3.7-8). The analysis of space and time from Book I, Part II explains how the different
properties of space and time affect our passions in different ways (see e.g., T 2.3.7.4-5). Garfield
recognizes sympathy as ‘one of the most important concealed mechanisms of custom’ (95). Yet
sympathy too is influenced by space and time. Hume allows that our sympathy with people who
are distant from us in space and time may be less lively and vivacious than our sympathy with
those people who are present and nearby (T 2.1.11.6). This effect of spatial and temporal
distance on sympathy has implications for Hume on morality (T 3.3.1.14-15). When it comes to
reasoning, Hume’s Book I, Part 3 division of two kinds of reason, demonstrative and probable, is
foundational to Books II and III of the Treatise. The two kinds of reason are central to his Book
II arguments that reason alone cannot motivate us into action (T 2.3.3.2-3), and further, to his
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Book III arguments that moral distinctions are not derived from reason (T 3.1.1.18-26).
Moreover, Hume’s account of probability plays a role in the fluctuating passions of joy, sorrow,
hope and fear (T 2.3.9). Starting with Book II risks minimizing and overlooking how the
fundamental epistemological background of Book I is extended to the passions in Book II of the
Treatise.
I highly recommend Garfield’s The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume’s Treatise
from the Inside Out to anyone interested in Hume’s thought. The work will be of particular
interest to Hume scholars as Garfield engages extensively in the vast secondary literature
throughout. Garfield’s approachable style of writing, and the wide range of topics and sources
covered also makes this book an excellent first stop for students at all levels and from a variety
of backgrounds, who are looking for a way into Hume’s Treatise or his philosophy in general.
ANGELA MICHELLE COVENTRY, Portland State University
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